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The “New Eastern Europe”:
 What to Do with the Histories of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova?
More than twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet
empire in Eastern Europe, the region is still grappling with the problem of its new identity and
the choice of an appropriate name to reflect it. There has been considerable talk about a “return
to Europe,” as well as the emergence of a “new Europe” and, as a consequence of the latter, the
birth of a “new Eastern Europe.” Where is Eastern Europe today? And if it is not where it used to
be, where did it go? If you Google “Eastern Europe+Map,” you will get about 11,600,000
results, a reassuring sign that the region is alive and well. But do not expect an easy answer to
the question of where it is actually located. 
The Web will provide you with endless variants, starting with those that treat the region
as everything between Prague in the west and the Ural Mountains in the east, and ending with
more “modest” proposals, like that of the CIA World Factbook, which would limit the region to
the former western borderlands of the Soviet Union, from Estonia in the north to Moldova in the
south. The confusion is understandable on more than one level. After all, it is no easy matter to
determine where Eastern Europe ends if you do not know where Europe per se ends. Europe is
not a continent in its own right, and its imagined eastern frontier is constantly on the move. It
would seem, however, that Europe and Eastern Europe are now moving in opposite directions. If
“Europe” is becoming more and more coterminous with the European Union, and not with the
geographic entity ending at the Urals, then “Eastern Europe,” for its part, is moving not
westward but eastward, encompassing the regions left outside the borders of the recently
expanded European Union. 
The world at large is understandably confused about the meaning of the term “Eastern
Europe.” So is the community of experts, whom the general public holds mainly responsible for
the persistent confusion. Political scientists and specialists in security studies and international
relations, who (unlike historians) have to deal with the region in “real time,” are trying hard to
come up with new definitions of the area. Their solution is to fragment the region, dividing it
into ever smaller entities. One result of this development is the eastward extension of Central
Europe, which now includes a number of former East European countries whose historians
insisted for decades on their East-Central European status. Another outcome is the reinvention of
the term “Eastern Europe.” As it went out of fashion among former East Europeans, they passed
it on as a kind of intellectual hand-me-down to the East, which has now been reinvented by
specialists in international studies as the “New Eastern Europe” (NEE).
The geographic scope of the term depends on the author and his/her location. For the
publishers of the journal Nowa Europa Wschodnia in Wrocław, the NEE includes almost
everything east of Poland. The authors of a position paper on the European Union’s Eastern
Partnership, produced in Stockholm, include Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the three
Transcaucasian states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in the NEE. A study produced in
Austria limits the term to the first three countries, excluding the Transcaucasus. There is clearly a
growing tendency to treat Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova as the core of the “New Eastern
Europe.” These countries have recently found themselves in a unique geopolitical position,
sandwiched between the extended European Union in the west and Russia in the east. They had
never been thought to constitute a distinct region and thus had no established group designation
in the world of international relations. The concept of East-Central Europe, so popular in Poland
since the 1950s, failed to fire the imagination of local elites in the NEE. But even outside the
region, there is no consensus on whether the countries of the NEE belong to East-Central
Europe. If Jerzy Kłoczowski, the most loyal supporter of the East-Central European idea, insists
on Ukraine’s belonging to the region, Paul Robert Magocsi includes only west and central
Ukraine in his Atlas of East-Central Europe. 
For better or for worse, “New Eastern Europe” emerges as the only term capable of
linking Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova together in their geopolitical no-man’s-land. The Baltic
states, which are included in the “Eastern Europe” of the CIA World Factbook, and the
Transcaucasian states, which are included in the “New Eastern Europe” of the EU Eastern
Partnership Program, have regional identities of their own. Not so Ukraine, Belarus, and
Moldova. If you partition the old Eastern Europe between the new Central Europe, the Baltics,
the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and, finally, Russia and Central Asia, the residue turns out to be
the three countries stuck in between: Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova—the quintessential “New
Eastern Europe.” 
Looking at the new political map of Eastern Europe, the question one wants to ask is
whether there is anything more to this otherwise nameless region than pure geopolitical accident.
Some scholars justifiably argue that the New East European identity has been invented outside
the region and imposed on it by political developments beyond its control. Others say that talking
about these countries as a separate region in historical terms means justifying the current division
of Europe and making it all but permanent. There are also voices claiming that a definition of
this region as a European rather than a Russian borderland is bound to encourage unwanted bids
for EU membership on the part of local elites. I shall leave aside the question of political
expediency. What I am interested in here is history and, in particular, the question of whether
looking at the history of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova as that of one region can help us better
understand its past and explain its current situation. 
Let us begin by considering whether the immediate past of these three countries contains
some common element that differentiates them from their neighbors on the other side of the
EU’s eastern border. Indeed it does: a mere twenty years ago they were western borderlands of
the USSR. Countries that were not part of the Soviet Union, like Bulgaria and Romania, whose
political and economic situation was little better than that of Ukraine or Moldova through most
of the 1990s, made it into the European Union, but those of the New Eastern Europe did not,
despite the frantic efforts of Ukrainian governments of the Orange Revolution era to crash the
European party. It appears that the internal “iron curtain” between the USSR and the socialist
countries of Eastern Europe was more formidable than the outer one that divided the capitalist
West from the socialist East. 
This explanation would probably suffice were it not for the Baltic states—former Soviet
republics that managed to join the European Union. Because the Baltic states are former Soviet
republics, the CIA World Factbook groups them together with Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova as
constituents of “Eastern Europe.” There are, however, major geographic, cultural, and historical
factors that link the NEE countries together while distinguishing them from the Baltic states. The
most “primordial” of these is geography. The northern border of the NEE more or less coincides
with the watershed between the Baltic and Black Sea basins. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
belong to the Baltic basin, while most of Belarus and all of Ukraine and Moldova belong to the
Black Sea basin, with the Dnieper, Dniester, and Prut as their largest rivers. If the Baltic
countries have been oriented for centuries toward the Baltic Sea and Northern Europe, the NEE
countries have been oriented toward the Black Sea. Throughout history they have occasionally
participated in Mediterranean political and cultural developments, but more often than not they
were cut off from the Mediterranean world by nomads. The Ottomans, who came to dominate
the nomads in the fifteenth century, controlled not only the northern Black Sea steppes but the
Black Sea Straits as well. 
Thus, although the NEE countries belonged to the Black Sea region, they gained little
benefit from the sea, early on becoming Europe’s ultimate midlands—an arena of competition
among foreign powers. Belarus, located on the Great European plain, found itself on the route of
choice for Western armies marching toward Russia and Russian armies marching west. Ukraine
became a bone of contention among Poland, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottomans, while
Moldavia, long an Ottoman outpost, became Russia’s gateway to the Balkans. The contrasting
geographic orientations of the countries of the Baltic and Black Sea basins mean that their
societies bring different historical experiences to the present and conceptualize the borderlands
of the European Union in various ways.
Culture and ethnicity are other important factors that set the countries of the NEE apart
from their Baltic neighbors. It suffices to mention religion. If in the case of the Baltics we are
dealing with Catholic and Protestant traditions, which set the region apart from Russia, the
dominant religious tradition in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova is Orthodoxy, which links them
intimately with Russia’s old and new imperial ideology. In the cases of Ukraine and Belarus,
there is also the phenomenon of East Slavic proximity, which allows Patriarch Kirill of Moscow
to speak of Holy Rus'—an ethnoreligious entity that includes Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.
Where religion and East Slavic identity work together, as in Belarus and eastern Ukraine, the
spell of the former imperial center is strongest. Where they do not reinforce each other, as in
Moldova and the former Habsburg lands of Ukraine, attachment to Moscow is less prominent or
completely nonexistent.
Thus the NEE is not just a figment of current geopolitical imagination. There are
geographic, cultural, ethnic, and historical factors that set it apart from its neighbors. But can
history as a discipline and we as its practitioners benefit from this new conceptualization of the
old Eastern Europe? I believe so, and I think that historians working in the region will be among
the primary beneficiaries of this approach. Now that the Soviet narrative has been largely
abandoned, EU prospects denied, and nationalist myths attacked, historians of the former Soviet
republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova are undergoing confusion and uncertainty.
Imagining the history of these three countries as that of a unit will help liberate their
historiographies from the isolation imposed by the dominance of local/national, pan-Russian, and
pan-Romanian paradigms and contribute to a better understanding of the histories of each
individual country and the region as a whole. In countries like Ukraine, history has once again
become a battleground between the old Soviet- or Russocentric narrative and national or overtly
nationalist paradigms. Under these circumstances, a new framework for historical analysis can
break the existing intellectual deadlock and lead historians and society at large to think about
their history in broader and more inclusive terms.
If there is one overriding paradigm that can link the countries of the NEE together and
help scholars of the region pose new questions and provide new answers, it is that of the
borderland or the political and/or cultural frontier. Imagining the countries of Eastern Europe as
a European frontier or even a bulwark of European civilization in order to enhance one’s
European credentials is of course an old device employed, not without success, by the
intellectual elites of the “old” Eastern Europe, which now count themselves as part of its Central
European core. Tony Judt wrote in this regard that “Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians have all
represented themselves in their literature and political myths as guarding the edges of “Europe”
(or Christianity). But as a brief glance at map suggests, their claims are mutually exclusive: they
can’t all be right.” In fact they can, if one looks at the map of early modern Eastern Europe, but
that is not the point. The point is to move beyond the “defenders of European values” paradigm.
The frontier approach, as developed in American and European historiography, allows one to
speak about much more than one nation’s role in the “defense” of European and Christian values.
It is much more productive to think of the NEE frontier as a meeting place of various
states, cultures, and nationalities. Historically, there were at least three types of borders that came
together in the NEE region: imperial (Russian, Ottoman, Habsburg, and Commonwealth);
cultural/religious, which divided Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Islam, and Judaism; and
ethnic/national. The list of the largest ethnic groups in the region would include, apart from
Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Moldovans/Romanians, also Poles, Lithuanians, Jews, Crimean
Tatars and, last but not least, Russians. These borders were associated with different cultures that
met, confronted one another, and negotiated a modus vivendi, producing new kinds of meanings
and understandings that shaped the region’s long-term identity. Here is just one of many
examples of such a hybrid identity in the region, which has to do with a religious encounter. In
the Middle Ages Catholicism and Orthodoxy met here, producing by the late sixteenth century a
hybrid Uniate Church that combined Orthodox ritual with Catholic dogma. In the 1830s that
church was liquidated in Belarus by the tsarist authorities, but its successor, the five-million-
strong Ukrainian Catholic Church, still exists in Ukraine. 
Another cultural encounter in the region was that between Christianity and Islam, which
took place as Moldova, the Crimea, and the northern Black Sea steppes all fell under Ottoman
tutelage in the fifteenth century. The return of the Crimean Tatars to their ancestral homeland
after the collapse of the Soviet Union reintroduced the Islamic factor into the region’s politics,
reminding us of the importance of the Christian-Islamic encounter in the past. Last but not least,
in the sixteenth century the region became a destination of choice for Jews expelled from
Western and Central Europe. It is the homeland of some of the best-known Jewish political and
cultural figures, including Golda Meir, Leon Trotsky, Abraham Malevich, and Isaac Babel. As
part of the Russian imperial Pale of Settlement, it also became the scene of some of the most
horrendous crimes against the Jewish population, including pogroms and the Holocaust.
Administered at various times by states dominated by Mongols, Lithuanians, Poles, Austrians,
Romanians, Germans, and Russians, the NEE also became a meeting point for a variety of
administrative systems and political cultures. This encouraged a unique popular adaptability to
political change at the top. It is no accident that the region has seen no major upheaval since
1992 (the military conflict in the Trasnistria region of Moldova) and that Ukraine and Belarus,
the largest countries of the region, have so far avoided major social turmoil and violent conflict
altogether. 
Did we not know all this before we began thinking about the NEE as a region with a
common historical identity? Of course we did, but a new analytical framework makes it possible
to see things not seen or neglected previously. Here are two examples of how looking at the
region as a whole can help us better understand its individual parts and, indeed, East European
history as a whole. The first example highlights the importance of the region not only as a major
actor in the history of cultural transfers between Europe’s West and East but also between its two
Easts: one Slavic, the other Greek or Mediterranean. Although the important role of Eastern
Orthodox hierarchs in the region was long stressed by scholars like Ihor Ševčenko and Edward
Keenan, it all but escaped the attention of historians focused on cultural relations between Russia
and the West. If the NEE countries are considered as a region, one sees more clearly the role of
the Greek East and the Mediterranean in the cultural transformation of the “old” Eastern Europe
long after its adoption of Christianity. The figure of the seventeenth-century Kyivan metropolitan
Peter Mohyla, a Moldavian prince, Polish noble, Ruthenian hierarch, and reformer of world
Orthodoxy (he produced the first Orthodox Confession of Faith) is emblematic of the historical
importance of the region and its internal and external connections.
The other example comes from the modern era. A focus on national history prevents one
from understanding what eventually caused the most profound change in the region, namely, the
“closing” of its cultural frontier—in other words, the elimination of its traditional ethnic and
cultural diversity. Blaming nationalism alone for this development will not do, given the
profound differences in the maturation and aggressiveness of ethnic nationalism in that part of
the world. The disappearance of many ethnic and religious minorities from the territory of
Belarus can hardly be attributed to the strength of Belarusian nationalism. When we look at the
region as a whole, it becomes more apparent that the transformation of the borderland from a
multiethnic and multicultural space into an ethnic and cultural monolith was accomplished
largely by “outside” powers with strong imperial ambitions. They managed to marshal resources
and mobilize the population on a scale unthinkable for the weak national movements of the
region, which generally served as junior partners in the cleansing of the borderlands,
occasionally undertaken with the tacit or even explicit approval of democratic world leaders. The
existing borders of the NEE countries are the best examples of such outside influence. The
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Holocaust, and the Yalta agreements shaped the new ethnocultural
landscape of the region, and we have a better chance of understanding such changes if we think
about the region as a unit.
Finally, I would like to address the question of the place that the history of the NEE can
or should occupy in university curricula here in North America. It is immediately obvious that
the study of the borderlands makes sense only in the broader context of the study of the entities
that possessed those borderlands. Thus defined, the study of these borderlands and frontiers
illuminates not only their history but also that of the dominant powers, which arguably define
themselves best on the margins, at points of encounter with their multiple others. The history of
the NEE, then, is best studied within the framework of an Eastern Europe broadly understood—
one that includes not only Poland but also Russia. There is probably no better way to understand
the frontier than to remove the borders!
